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The Standard of Proof in Phase I Merger Decisions: The Lesson 
from the Microsoft/Skype Appeal 
Andriani Kalintiri, Queen Mary University of London 
 
Introduction 
How ‘certain’ must the Commission be that a notified concentration will or will not impede 
effective competition on the market, if allowed to proceed, before it lawfully adopts a decision 
prohibiting or authorising it respectively? This question largely synopsises the heart of the heated 
discussions that the famous trilogy of merger annulments in Schneider Electric, Airtours and Tetra 
Laval incited. Amidst a general feeling that the evidence expectations of the European Courts 
had sharply increased, attempts were made to positively identify the standard of proof governing 
merger analysis.1 The issue is not one to take lightly. In view of the prognostic nature of merger 
control, what standard of proof the Commission has to satisfy determines not only the practical 
perception of the ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ test as established in the EU 
Merger Regulation, but also the legitimacy of its decision-making. In this context, this paper 
discusses the significance of the latest judicial insight into the problem of the standard of proof 
governing Phase I merger decisions as provided by the General Court in Cisco’s appeal against 
the Commission’s authorisation of the Microsoft/Skype concentration.2 
 
The Meaning of the ‘Serious Doubts’ Test 
As is well known, article 6(1)(b) of the EU Merger Regulation allows the Commission to 
authorise a notified concentration, whether subject to conditions or not, where it finds that this 
‘does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market’.3 Indeed, in 
acknowledgment of the generally pro-competitive nature of corporate reorganisations, the 
Commission clears most mergers with a Community dimension. However, the strict time-limits 
within which a Phase I decision has to be adopted create considerable evidence challenges for 
the Commission, which only has 25 days at the most (or 35 days where commitments have been 
offered by the merging entities) to gather evidence, evaluate it and decide on the compatibility of 
the notified transaction with the common market.4 The time pressure, combined with the 
complexity of the assessments that the Commission has to undertake and the information 
asymmetries which it is confronted with, have reasonably led some commentators to suggest that 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the light of the recent case law 
of the Community Courts’ (2005) 1 European Competition Journal 3. 
2 Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission [2013] ECR I-000. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(EUMR) OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p 1–22. 
4 Article 10(1) of the EUMR. 
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the standard of proof that the Commission has to satisfy in Phase I proceedings is possibly lower 
than the level of persuasion expected in Phase II investigations.5  
Nonetheless, the case-law of the European Courts seems to suggest otherwise. A bit more 
than a decade ago, in BaByliss the General Court (then Court of First Instance) partly annulled 
the Commission decision declaring the concentration between SEB/Moulinex as compatible with 
the common market subject to Phase I commitments.6 As the Court noted, there is no difference 
in the evaluation of commitments depending on the stage of the proceedings. On the contrary, 
given that ‘an in-depth market study is not carried out in Phase I’, the Commission had to 
demonstrate that the commitments were ‘sufficient to rule out clearly any serious doubts’ as to 
whether effective competition on the market would be significantly impeded, were the 
transaction to be authorised.7 Finding that the Commission failed to satisfy this test with respect 
to five markets, the Court partly annulled the Commission’s decision.8 
The same test was reiterated a few years later in easyJet. This time the Court concluded that 
the applicant had not sufficiently demonstrated why the Commission’s decision to authorise – 
subject to conditions – the Air France/KLM merger was erroneous. However, in so doing, the 
Court considered whether ‘the Commission was entitled, without committing a manifest error of 
assessment, to take the view that [the proposed] commitments constituted a direct and sufficient 
response capable of clearly dispelling all serious doubts’.9 
The arguably strong language of the General Court seems to invalidate the assumption that 
the standard of proof is lower in Phase I proceedings. In contrast, the fact that the Commission 
must demonstrate that ‘all serious doubts’ have been eliminated,  either because of the proposed 
commitments or in light of the available evidence, seems to correspond to a considerably high 
threshold of persuasion.10 In this context, the question arises what is the standard of proof to 
which Phase I merger analysis is subject. Is it lower or higher than the degree of ‘certainty’ 
required in Phase II, or is it the same and if so, what is it exactly? 
 
The General Court’s Ruling in Cisco 
Cisco’s appeal against the Commission decision clearing the notified Microsoft/Skype concentration 
pursuant to Phase I proceedings provided the General Court with an excellent opportunity to 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Yves Botteman, ‘Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence’ (2006) 2 Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 71, 76-77; Ioannis Kokkoris and Ioannis Lianos, The Reform of EC Competition 
Law: New Challenges (Kluwer Law International 2010) 306. 
6 Commission Decision SG (2002) D/228078 of 8 January 2002. 
7 Case T-114/02  BaByliss SA v Commission [2003] ECR II-1279, para 169. 
8 The Court found that the Commission failed to ‘clearly rule out any serious doubts’ as to the possible significant 
anti-competitive effect that the concentration could have on competition in Italy, Spain, Finland, the UK and 
Ireland. See also Case T-119/02 Royal Philips Electronics v Commission [2003] II-1433, as regards the standard of proof 
applicable to a referral decision. According to para 343, the Commission ‘cannot decide to make such a referral, if 
(…) it is clear, on the basis of a body of precise and coherent evidence, that such a referral cannot safeguard or 
restore effective competition on the relevant markets’. 
9 Case T-177/04  easyJet v Commission  [2006] ECR II-1931, paras 128-129. 
10 See also Laura Parret, ‘Sense and Nonsense of Rules on Proof in Cartel Cases’ (Workshop on the Law and 
Economics of Competition Policy, Bonn 2008) 21: ‘in the first phase one might consider the standard of reasonable 
doubt to apply: only serious doubts about the compatibility with the common market can lead to not clearing the 
merger within the short time limits of the first phase’. 
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clarify its position on the issue. Besides its two main pleas alleging manifest errors of assessments 
as regards the evaluation of the horizontal effects of the concentration on the consumer 
communications market and the effect of potential interoperability between Skype’s user base 
and Lync’s services on the enterprise communications market, Cisco additionally challenged the 
standard of proof incumbent on the Commission under the EU Merger Regulation and the 
standard of review exercised by the General Court.11 
 In particular, Cisco argued that the Commission does not enjoy any discretion when adopting 
a clearance decision under article 6(1)(b) of the EU Merger Regulation. Accordingly, the question 
that the Court has to consider is not whether the concentration in question significantly impedes 
effective competition in the common market, but rather ‘whether the concentration objectively 
gives rise to serious doubts requiring further investigation’.12 Because of this, what the 
Commission should have demonstrated is that ‘beyond any reasonable doubt, the concentration 
at issue did not give rise to competition concerns, even on the narrowest possible market’.13 
Couched in these terms, Cisco’s argument seems to suggest that the standard of proof for Phase I 
clearance decisions is akin to the criminal standard of persuasion ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’. 
However, the General Court was quick to dismiss this allegation on a number of grounds. 
 First and most importantly, the General Court acknowledged that the tests in article 6 and 
article 8 of the EU Merger Regulation are different on their face: article 6 asks for ‘serious 
doubts’ as to the compatibility of the concentration with the common market, whilst an article 8 
decision requires ascertaining whether the concentration ‘would significantly impede effective 
competition’ or not. However, it observed that ‘the assessment criteria on which the 
Commission must rely when taking either an article 6 or an article 8 EUMR decision are the 
same’. Therefore, ‘whether the Commission authorises (…) a concentration at the end of the 
first stage or after a second stage of examination, the standard of proof is identical’.14 
 Secondly, reiterating the lesson from Impala II the General Court confirmed once again that 
the same standard of proof applies to both clearance and prohibition decisions.15 Indeed, the 
Commission is required to decide whether the notified concentration is either compatible or 
incompatible with the common market on the basis of the economic development ‘which is the 
most likely to ensue’.16 Because of the prospective nature of the analysis though, the General 
Court stressed that ‘an assessment of probabilities is therefore involved (…) and not (…) an 
obligation on the Commission to show beyond any reasonable doubt that a concentration does 
not give rise to any competition concerns’.17 
 Finally, the General Court explained that, even if the concept of ‘serious doubts’ is objective 
in the sense that the Commission does not enjoy any discretion as regards the initiation of Phase 
II proceedings once the existence of serious doubts has been demonstrated, this does not imply 
                                                 
11 For a brief analysis of the case, see Laurent Godfroid and Jeff Liu, ‘Cisco: General Court's ruling dismissing an 
appeal against Microsoft/Skype merger’ (2014) 5 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 144. 
12 Cisco v Commission, para 43. 
13 ibid. 
14 Cisco v Commission, para 46. 
15 See Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala  [2008] ECR I-4951, paras 50-53. 
16 Cisco v Commission, para 47. 
17 ibid. 
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that the Commission does not enjoy any discretion in deciding whether ‘serious doubts’ exist in 
the first place. On the contrary, to ascertain whether the notified concentration gives rise to 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, the Commission must carry out 
complex economic assessments, for which it has a certain margin of discretion according to 
settled case-law.18 Therefore, the General Court held that ‘an identical standard of judicial review’ 
applies too, regardless of whether decisions are adopted under article 6 or article 8 of the EU 
Merger Regulation.19 
 
The Importance of the General Court’s Ruling 
A number of significant conclusions can be drawn from the General Court’s judgment in Cisco. 
First, the Court made it crystal clear that Phase I and Phase II decisions are both subject to the 
same threshold of evidence sufficiency. In this way, it reinforced the argument that the standard 
of proof governing merger analysis is uniform and does not vary depending on the progress of 
the proceedings or the issue to be proved. Moreover, by acknowledging that merger evaluation is 
in essence ‘an assessment of probabilities’, the Court dismissed a ‘criminalised’ understanding of 
the ‘serious doubts’ test and allowed some room for justified uncertainty, which is unavoidable 
given the ex ante nature of merger control. 
 Nonetheless, one is left wondering how far the requirement for elimination of ‘all serious 
doubts’ is from persuasion ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’. Read in the light of previous case-law, 
the Cisco ruling seems to suggest: not too far. By favouring an identical standard of proof across 
merger proceedings, the Court extended the scope of Impala II to Phase I clearance decisions and 
confirmed the arguably heavy obligation on the Commission to always take a positive decision to 
the effect of either prohibiting or authorising the notified concentration.20 By the same token, 
when reviewing the Commission’s decision, the Court must ‘consider whether any possible 
omissions on the part of the Commission are capable of calling into question its findings that the 
present concentration does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common 
market’.21 Thus, also in Phase I clearance decisions the Commission must rely on evidence which 
is ‘factually accurate, reliable and consistent’, which ‘contains all the information which must be 
taken into account in order to assess a complex situation’ and ‘is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it’.22 
 As regards the eternal problem of which type of error is preferable in merger analysis, that 
is, false positives vs false negatives, the Cisco ruling exemplifies the Court’s dislike of both 
errors.23 In line with its review function, the Court’s intention is rather to equally eliminate Type 
                                                 
18 ibid, para 49. 
19 ibid, para 50. 
20 On the merits of having a symmetrical standard of proof see Kathryn Wright, ‘Perfect symmetry? Impala v 
Commission and standard of proof in mergers’ (2007) 32 European Law Review 408; also Pal Szilagyi, ‘The ECJ has 
spoken: where do we stand with standard of proof in merger control?’ (2008) 29 European Competition Law 
Review 726. 
21 See Cisco v Commission, para 50. Also Case T-282/06 Sun Chemical Groups and Others v Commission [2007] ECR II-
2149, para 60 and Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV (Tetra Laval II) [2005] ECR I-987, para 39. 
22 ibid. 
23 See also the discussion in David Bailey, ‘Standard of Proof in EC Merger Proceedings: A Common Law 
Perspective’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 845, 870-873. 
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I and Type II errors. By setting the bar as high for Phase I clearance decisions as for Phase II 
proceedings, the Court proved that it is just as concerned with safeguarding the merging entities’ 
rights as with the protection of consumers and competition.24 In this regard, the lesson from the 
Cisco ruling is that the Commission must always be on the safe side.25 This precautionary 
approach is all the more necessary in Phase I clearance decisions, since the Commission cannot 
compensate any errors in its evaluation at a later stage, as is the case with an erroneous finding of 
‘serious doubts’. Admittedly, in Cisco the Court upheld the approval of the Microsoft/Skype 
merger. However, the rule remains that if there are any serious doubts about the compatibility of 
the concentration with the common market, the correct approach is to initiate Phase II 
proceedings – even if this necessitates spending some more time and resources – in order to 
ensure that no significant impediment to effective competition will occur as a result of the 
concentration. 
 
Conclusion 
The Cisco ruling on the standard of proof governing Phase I clearance decisions falls in line with 
earlier jurisprudence on the issue. The General Court explicitly stated that the ‘serious doubts’ 
test cannot be given a ‘criminalised’ interpretation in light of the prospective nature of merger 
analysis. Nonetheless, nor can the Commission simply clear the notified transaction, if it 
entertains any serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. On the contrary, 
the standard of proof governing Phase I proceedings is identical to the degree of persuasion 
expected under Phase II investigations. By ruling so, the General Court confirmed once again 
the absence of any presumption of lawfulness or unlawfulness for concentrations with a 
Community dimension and verified its intention to subject merger analysis to high procedural 
standards with a view to safeguarding effective competition in the common market. 
 
                                                 
24 See also Case T-87/05 Energias de Portugal SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, para 74, where the Court observed 
that ‘the Commission could not conclude that where there is doubt it must prohibit the concentration’. On the 
contrary, the Commission must ‘demonstrate that that concentration (…) must be declared incompatible with the 
common market because it still leads to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position that SIEC’. 
25 See also Ben Van Rompuy, ‘Implications for the Standard of Proof in EC Merger Proceedings: Bertelsmann and 
Sony Corporation of America v. Impala (C-413/06 P) ECJ’ (2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 608, 610. 
